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The work of Committee I at the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, dealing with the seabed beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, is as interesting as it is important. Its task
is the establishment of a legal regime to govern the last great store
of undivided and accessible resources. The structure of this regime
is of immediate concern to almost all States. Producers of raw materials likely to be recovered from the seabed fear the impact on
their economies; potential exploiters of the area fear interference
with the activities and profitability of their capital-intensive enterprises; land-locked and many developing States fear that the original concept of the "common heritage of mankind" will not satisfactorily be translated into reality. The body charged with the reconciliation of such conflicting interests contains an imbalance between
the group of States with the greatest economic and political power
and the group of States having the greatest voting power; both
sides have an uneasy relationship with the multinational enterprises upon whose cooperation the success of the regime will, to
some extent, depend. This Article attempts to outline the events
leading up to the submission of Part I of the Informal Single Nego* Lecturer in Law, University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology, Cardiff, United Kingdom.
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tiating Text1 by the Chairman of Committee I at the end of the
Geneva session of the Conference, to examine the contents of that
document, and to suggest some of the wider implications of developments regarding the international seabed area.
THE H-ISTORY OF THE TEXT

It-may be useful to summarize the events which led to the produc-

tion of the Text. 2 On August 17, 1967, Dr. Pardo, the Maltese Ambassador to the United Nations, proposed the inclusion of an item
on the agenda of the 22nd session of the General Assembly, to be
entitled "Declaration and Treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and
the use of their resources in the interests of mankind."3 The United
States Congress reacted swiftly with the introduction on September
13 of the first of several resolutions aimed at preventing any rapid
action on the Maltese proposal and specifically of preventing the
vesting of the area in the United Nations. This attitude, at best
cautious and at worst obstructionist, was reflected by many States
in the First Committee of the United Nations, where the Maltese
proposal was discussed following Dr. Pardo's famous speech on November 1, 1967. 4 The advanced States, including ,the United Kingdom,5 the United States 6 and the Soviet Union urged a cautious
approach limited initially to a careful study of the problems raised
by the Maltese proposal and discussed by Dr. Pardo in his introductory speech to the First Committee. Many of the other participants in the debates preferred a cautious approach based upon
further study of the issue. Only a handful of States, including
Ghana, 8 Sweden,9 and Cyprus,10 turned their attention to the
1. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Pt. 1 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as
the Text], reproduced in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 682 (1975).
2. See also E. LuARD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEA-BED: A NEW INTERNATIONAL IssuE 81-193 (1974); Weissberg, InternationalLaw Meets the ShortTerm National Interest: The Maltese Proposal on the Sea-Bed and Ocean
Floor-ItsFate in Two Cities, 18 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 41 (1969). A concise
account of the major events appears in the Yearbooks of the United Na-

tions.
3. U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
4. 22 U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515, at 1 (1967).
5. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1524, at 2-4.
6. Id., U.N. Doc. A/Cl/PV.1524, at 4-5.
7. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1525, at 3-4. The U.S.S.R. was the most cautious, being unwifling to go beyond a study of the state of present activity
among bodies dealing with various aspects of the problem.
8. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1526, at 7-8.
9. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1I/PV.1527, at 12-14.
10. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1I/PV.1530, at 5-7.
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substantive suggestions of Dr. Pardo's speech and urged that the
United Nations should take action by declaring the principles of a
new regime in the immediate future.
There was already evident a split between the advanced States,
who stood to lose some of their existing advantages in the race to
the ocean resources, and the developing States, who in general 1
would benefit from the adoption of a regime to replace the freedom
of access which was the law at that time. The main concern of
participants in the debate was the procedure to be followed in examining the problem, rather than the substance of any future
regime. It was therefore comparatively easy to secure agreement
on the proposal 12 (submitted by Belgium on behalf of a group
of 34 "States13) for the establishment of an ad hoc committee of
35 States 14 to consider the question. The Ad Hoc Committee was
established by the General Assembly on December 18, 1967, by resolution 2340 (XXII).
1968
Before the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee in March 1968,
member States were invited to submit their views on the scope of
the Committee's activity. The replies of the developed States manifested the same cautious approach based upon study of the problem
and the survey of current activity, while some of the developing
States and, again, Sweden, adopted a more positive stance and gave
greater emphasis to the substance of the problem and to moves for
the establishment of a new regime.' 5
The word of the Ad Hoc Committee was divided between the
Legal Working Group and the Economic and Technical Working
Group. In both, in the words of the Tanzanian delegate, "it was
clear that there was a 'great divide' between the developed and the
11. Some developing states had national interests, such as growing off-

shore oil industries or wide claims to national jurisdiction which they felt
might be prejudiced by the intended regime, and they therefore sided with
the more cautious states.
12. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.410 (1967).
13. 22 U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.1I/PV.1542, at 1 (1967).
14. The draft resolution was adopted 93 to 0 with 1 abstention, id., U.N.
Doc. A/C.1/PV.1542, at 47-50.
15. 23 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc. Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.135/1, at 19 (1968).

developing countries and that certain developed countries would
prefer the Committee's work to proceed very slowly.""' This he
attributed to a desire "to frustrate the interests of the developing
countries." Not only was this "great divide" evident in the approaches to the procedure of the Committee, but also it appeared
in the attitudes to the substantive aspects of the problem. Thus,
early in the meetings of the Economic and Technical Working
Group it became clear that "western" developed States favored a
"minimalist" regime, with little control over activities on the deep
seabed, based upon registration of claims and payment of royalties.1 7 Similarly, the Soviet bloc was not prepared to support any
new machinery at that time. 8 The developing States, on the other
hand, seemed intent on establishing more complex machinery. 9
This difference in approach was epitomized in the Report of the
Ad Hoc Committee on its 1968 session, which noted the failure to
secure agreement on the principles to be submitted to the General
Assembly. Included in the report were two alternative sets of proposals said to "contain an indication of the support that the various
ideas received. '20 The first set of proposals provided for a fairly
detailed declaration of general principles governing the area, including the establishment of an international machinery to secure
the equitable distribution of benefits arising from the exploitation
of the area. These proposals originated in a Working Paper submitted by 15 developing States. 21 The second set of proposals was
submitted by the United Kingdom delegate, and was a much less
detailed "statement of agreed principles." While accepting that the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction should be reserved for peaceful
purposes and its resources used for the benefit of all mankind, the
proposals contained no indication of the nature of the regime to
be established.
These alternatives were considered at the 26th meeting of the Ad
Hoc Committee. The first proposal drew its support from the developing States, while the second proposal drew support from the
developed States. The U.S.S.R. reserved its position. 22 Despite
the cautious attitude resulting from the desire to protect their ex16. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/WG.2/SR.1, at 41.
17. See the contribution of the United Kingdom delegate, id., U.N. Doc.

A/AC.135/WG.2/SR.8, at 14-15.

18. See the contribution of the U.S.S.R. delegate, id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/
WG.2/SR.9, at 23-26.
19. See the contribution of the Thai delegate, id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/
WG.2/SR.8 at 16-17.
20. Id., U.N. A/7230.
21. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/36.
22. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/SR.26.
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tended national claims to jurisdiction which to some extent set the
Latin American bloc apart from other developing States, they voted
for the first set of articles. When the principles were considered
by the First Committee, the divisions reappeared, stated in stronger
and more colorful terms. It was not possible to agree upon a set
of principles for recommendation to the General Assembly; instead,
the Maltese delegate proposed that the alternatives be referred to
be set up to replace the
the Permanent Committee which was 2to
3
Ad Hoc Committee, and this was agreed.
The work of the United Nations on the seabed in 1968 was completed with the adoption, as resolution 2467 (XXIII), on December
21 of four resolutions passed to the General Assembly by the First,
Committee. The first resolution established a 42-State Permanent
Committee to replace the Ad Hoc Committee, and was passed by
112 votes to none, with seven abstentions including the U.S.S.R.
The Soviet objection was that the Communist bloc was inadequately represented-an objection based not upon the arithmetical
distribution of seats among States, but upon their desire to secure
the socialist interest against that of "imperialist" States.2 4 The
importance of membership of the Committee was also stressed by
other States.25 The issue became a constant theme in debates on
the distribution of power within the Committee and within the
machinery of the projected regime.
The second resolution, passed unanimously, requested the Secretary General to undertake a study of the hazards of pollution and
harmful effects arising from the exploitation of the deep seabed.
The third resolution requested the Secretary General to report
on the establishment "in due time" of appropriate international machinery to promote the exploitation of the area. The interests and
needs of the developing countries were to be given special consideration. It was passed by 85 votes 'to nine, with 25 abstentions. This
resolution, of course, went directly against the cautious approach
of the developed western States, and these States abstained on
the vote. The Soviet bloc voted against it, consistent with their
23. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1538-1649, 1648th meeting.
24. Id., U.N. Doc. A/PV.1752, at 27-30.

25. See, e.g., the comments of the Ceylonese delegate, id., U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/PV.1649, at 4-5.

stronger opposition to such rapid progress towards a regime which
they considered would be centered on a supranational machinery
in which "the principal posts of command... would inevitably be
in the hands of the capitalist monopolies of certain imperialist
powers" and which would become "just one more mechanism for
the enrichment of rapacious monopolies and the execution of neocolonialist policies.1 26 The overwhelming vote in favor of the motion was constituted by the developing States, including the Latin
American bloc, and the Scandinavian bloc. The Scandinavian vote
was explicable partly in terms of their internationalism and partly
in terms of their interests as States possessing very limited continental margins.
The fourth resolution, passed without vote, initiated the International Decade for Ocean Exploration, following an American initia2 7
tive in the Ad Hoc Committee.
At the end of 1968, then, a number of trends were already evident.
Firstly, it was significant that from the beginning the issue was
assigned to the First Committee (Political and Security Committee)
rather than the Sixth (Legal) Committee. This was, perhaps, due
partly to the emphasis given to the reservation of the area for
peaceful purposes, but was also a consequence of the light in which
the proposals for the exploitation of the resources were seen. This
was no matter of codifying or revising existing legal principles, but
an attempt to reconcile conflicting international interests and potential interests in a new regime to be established ab initio in accordance with overtly political criteria. Perhaps it was recognized
that international law is a living process and that the interests of
the fifty or so States which had come into being since the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea could not be accommodated satisfactorily within a legal framework drawn up largely to meet the
interests of the "traditional" maritime powers.
Secondly, the importance of the allocation of seats on the Committee underlines the perception of a split between the interests
of the developing and the developed States in their views on the
substance of a future regime as well as their views on the procedure
by which the regime should be established. Particularly noteworthy were the positions of the Soviet delegation, which adopted
the most conservative line, and the Latin American States, which
began the careful maneuvers dictated by the necessity to protect
26. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1I/PV.1592, at 3-4 (Mr. Mendelevich).

27. Id., U.N. Doc A/AC.135/33.
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their extended claims to national jurisdiction28 while retaining
links with their "natural allies," the developing States.
The third trend was the rapid progress made by the Economic
and Technical Working Group compared with the Legal Working
Group. This was largely a reflection of the fact that most States
knew very little about the resources of the seabed, and particularly
the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. However, there is a more
general tendency for the law to lag behind the advancement of technology in marine affairs.
1969
Activity in the Permanent Committee in the Spring of 1969 centered upon the attempt to arrive at an agreed set of principlesa task passed on to it by the Ad Hoe Committee. The attitudes
of States remained roughly the same. Thus, the U.S.S.R. continued
to assert that the present law was adequate and to oppose the establishment of a special legal status based on the concept of the "common heritage of mankind." 29 The United Kingdom continued to
declare that the concept had no established meaning, and that its
implications must be carefully worked out and in such a way as
not to destroy the incentives for new industries, concluding that
"agreement could be achieved only by a gradual process."3 0 The
developing States continued to urge for rapid movement towards
a strong regime, 31 the Mexican delegate going so far as to propose
that a declaration by the General Assembly of legal principles and
conditions governing the area would have binding effect pending
the conclusion of a convention on the matter. 32 Perhaps there was
in his mind, as there clearly was in the minds of other delegates,
THE LAW or = SEA
28. See F.V. GARcA-AmAD R, LATnN AmCA A
(1972).
29. 24 U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the

Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction [hereinafter cited
as the Permanent Committee], U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/SC.l/SR.8, at 79-82
(1969).
30. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.1/SR.6, at 47.
31. See, e.g., id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.1I/SR.5, at 42-44 (Brazil); id.,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.1I/SR.10, at 119-20 (Brazil); id., U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/
SC.1/SR.11, at 129-30 (Thailand).
32. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.1/SR.5/, at 38-40.

the precedent of the Outer Space Treaty3" concluded the year before.
Between the second and third sessions of the Legal Subcommittee, an informal drafting group, composed of Brazil, India, Libya,
Norway, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, prepared a report on
the alternative proposals for a set of principles. 34 This led to the
preparation of a "synthesis" 35 eventually adopted as part of the
Committee's report for that year. 36 While it was possible to point
out certain areas of agreement (such as the existence of an area
of seabed incapable of national appropriation, which was to be reserved for peaceful purposes, and the resources of which should
be used for the benefit of mankind), it was evident that there was
still fundamental disagreement on the details. Thus, there was no
agreement on the limits of the area, or upon even the main features
of the regime.
The differences of approach had been made clear when the Economic and Technical Committee considered the Study on the establishment of an appropriate international machinery3 7 prepared by
the Secretary General pursuant to General Assembly resolution
2467 C of 1968. As before, the developing States advocated a strong
international machinery,38 whereas the developed States favored a
much weaker machinery operating as little more than a registry
of claims or at best through a licensing system.3 9 The U.S.S.R.
delegate continued to display a singular reluctance to enter into
any "hasty" discussions on the matter.40 The Study itself, of
course, made no recommendations on the most suitable type of machinery, but nonetheless, a cautious and conservative attitude can
be inferred from the prominence given to discussion of the registration and licensing functions of the Authority.
The debates proceeded along well-established lines in the First
Committee, and also in the General Assembly, which again completed the year's work with the passing of four resolutions. Two
33. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERAms 386 (1967). On the
legal effects, see Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" InternationalCustomary Law?, 5 INniAI J. INT'L L. 23 (1965).
34. 24 U.N. GAOR, Perm. Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.1/4 (1969).
35. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.1/9.
36. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/18/Add.1.
37. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/12.
38. See, e.g., id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.2/SR.18, at 47-48 (India); id.,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.2/SR.21, at 92-93 (Trinidad & Tobago).
39. See, e.g., ,id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.2/SR.20, at 65-70 (France); id.,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.2/SR.20, at 70-73 (United Kingdom); id., U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/SC.2/SR.21, at 80-83 (United States).
40. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.2/SR.20, at 73.
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of these, resolutions 2574 B and 2574 C, were passed without opposition, but with one and 11 abstentions respectively. These resolutions simply requested the Committee to expedite its work of preparing a comprehensive and balanced statement of principles and
to formulate recommended rules and economic and technical conditions for the exploitation of the area. The Secretary General was
requested to continue his study on various types of international
machinery, paying particular attention to the detailed question of
its status, structure, functions and powers.
The other two resolutions met with more opposition. Resolution
2574 A requested the Secretary General to solicit the views of member States on the desirability of convening a law of the sea conference to consider all aspects of the law of the sea. This ran contrary
to the wishes of those developed States who, satisfied with the 1958
Conventions, looked with dismay upon any attempt to supplant
those laboriously prepared and negotiated texts. The resolution was
also at odds with the wishes of those States who sought a rapid
-conclusion to the debate on the international seabed area, and
thought that agreement on that issue was likely to be considerably
delayed by throwing all the numerous and complex issues of the
law of the sea into the melting pot. This resolution therefore
gained less support, being passed by 65 votes to 12, with 30 abstentions.
The last resolution, 2574 D, declared that
pending the establishment of the ...

international regime ...

States and persons, physical and juridical are bound to refrain
from all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of
the subsoil thereof, beyond the
the seabed and ocean floor, and
limits of national jurisdiction.41

This so-called "Moratorium Resolution '42 met with strong opposition from most developed States, who sympathized with the American delegates' view that retardation of progress in the development
of deep-sea technology 'helped no 'one. It was felt that the resolution
might actually encourage States set upon seabed exploitation to extend their national claims unreasonably to "legitimize" activities beyond the present limits of national jurisdiction. The resolution was
passed by 62 votes to 28, with 28 abstentions.
41. Id., U.N. Doc. A/P.V.1833.
42. It has been argued by some developing states that this resolution has

1970
The 1970 session culminated in a more tangible achievement than
the earlier sessions; a Declaration of Principles governing the area
was adopted by the General Assembly at the end of the year. In
addition, the session saw considerable progress in the discussion of
the details of the type of machinery to be established to have jurisdiction over the area. Pursuant to resolution 2574 C (XXIV), the
Secretary General submitted a more detailed study43 to follow up

that submitted in 1969. This set out some of the criticisms of the
licensing and registry models described in the earlier report, and
made the significant move of including a detailed examination of
international machinery having comprehensive powers, as suggested by a number of developing States.
The United States, 44 United Kingdom,45 and France 40 also submitted working papers on a regime for the area. The American
Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area sought to find
a compromise on the much-disputed issue of boundaries by interposing an International Trusteeship Area between the continental shelf
under national jurisdiction, which would extend as far as the 200
meter isobath, and the international seabed area proper, which
would begin at a point beyond the base of the continental slope
where the downward inclination of the surface of the seabed declines to a gradient which would have been determined by technical experts. 47 Even if this had been acceptable as a compromise
on the issue of boundaries, there was little compromise on the nature of the machinery, this being based on a "weak" licensing Au48
thority.
The United Kgdom Working Paper also suggested a "licensing
and royalties" regime, with a machinery bound by precisely stated
rules and criteria which it would be obliged to follow in its operations. The French Working Paper adhered to this "Western" approach by also suggesting a regime based on registration and licensing, and a machinery with tightly-defined powers. It was quite
a binding effect. Even if unanimous declarations by the general assembly
are regarded as having some quasi-legislative effect, there is little to be
said for ascribing such effect to a resolution passed, as in this case, by a

narrow majority.
43. 25 U.N. GAOR, Perm. Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/23 (1970).
44. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/25.
45. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/26.
46. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/27.
47. See Auburn, The International Seabed Area, 20 INT'L & CoW. L.Q.
173 (1971).
48. See, e.g., 25 U.N. GAOR, Perm. Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/25, art.
68, at 21-22 (1970).
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clear that these developed States 49 preferred the more conservative
of the models discussed in the Secretary General's Study, while the
developing States retained their preference for a much stronger
Authority with greater discretion and power in the administration
of the area. 0
Two other matters took on increasing importance during the session; first, the problem of transferring technology so as to ensure
the participation of developing States in the exploitation of the
area, and second, the vital question of how the benefits, both financial and nonfinancial, (for example, development of technology,
servicing industries, etc.) would be distributed. This latter point,
left open in the American draft convention, was the subject of a
preliminary note of the Secretariat. 51 The Committee recognized
that there was an urgent need for further consideration of this
problem.
The attempts in the Committee and its Legal Subcommittee to
arrive at an agreed text of a Declaration of Principles failed, but
the Chairman continued informal negotiations with members after
the end of its 1970 session. A text 52 was agreed upon in time
for submission to the General Assembly's 25th session. This text
did not represent a perfect consensus, but rather the highest degree
of agreement then attainable. It did not represent a provisional
regime applicable to the area pending the establishment of a permanent regime, but only a first step towards that regime. 53 Although
there undoubtedly was considerable compromise on the part of
many States, this was on the question of what should be expressed
in the Declaration, rather than on the substance of the principles
themselves. It is clear from the debates of the First Committee
on the draft that the acquiescence of States in the final draft was
attributable to the exceptional vagueness of the language, which
allowed virtually any national position to be reconciled with the
49. See also the Working Papers submitted to the Economic and Technical
Subcommittee by the United States and Canada, id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/29,
app. IV.
50. See, e.g., the Working Paper submitted by Cameroon and 11 other
States, id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/29, app. ]EI.
51. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/24.
52. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C1./L.544.
53. See id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1PV.1773, at 13 (Mr. Amerasinghe); id., U.N.
Doc. A/C.1/PV.1781, at 2 (Mr. Pohl).

Principles. However, the "fragile balance" was preserved, and the
Declaration was adopted on December 17, 1970, by the General Assembly, with 108 votes in favor, none against, and 14 abstentions,
as resolution 2749 (XXV).
Three other resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly
on the same day. The first resolution, derived from a draft resolution5 4 submitted to the First Committee by a group of developing
States, requested the Secretary General to cooperate with UNCTAD
in the preparation of a report on the impact of seabed minerals
on the prices of mineral exports on the world market and on the
economic well-being of developing countries, and to propose effective solutions to the problems arising. It was adopted as resolution 2750 A (XXV) by 104 votes to 0, with 16 abstentions.
The second resolution requested the Secretary General, in collaboration with UNCTAD, to prepare a report on the problems of
land-locked States, especially in relation to the exploitation of the
international seabed. The draft, introduced into the First Committee 55 by twelve land-locked States, met with some criticism for
singling out land-locked States from other geographical disadvantaged States. The criticism was similar to that directed towards
the draft on the economic impact of seabed minerals which had
singled out developing states. Nevertheless, it was approved in the
First Committee and adopted by the Assembly as resolution 2750
B (XXV) by 111 votes to 0, with 11 abstentions.
The third and most important resolution passed on that day decided to convene a conference on the law of the sea in 1973, and
to charge the Seabed Committee, to which 44 States would be added,
with the task of preparing for that conference. Three draft resolutions on this question were set before the First Committee: 50 the
American draft, which sought to confine the projected conference
to a consideration of the problems left unresolved at the 1958 and
1960 Law of the Sea Conferences; and the developing States' drafts,
which would have reopened consideration of all the problems of
the law of the sea, which were seen as being inextricably linked
with each other; and a final "compromise" text,r7 which tended towards the approach of the developing States. It was accepted by
54. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.543/Rev.l/Corr.1.
55. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.551.

56. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.536/Rev.1.

(United States); id., U.N. Doc.

A/C.l/L.539 (Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago); id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.545 (fivepower developing States).

57. Id., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.562 (23-power "compromise" draft).
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the First Committee, and adopted by the Assembly by 108 votes to
7,58 with 6 abstentions, as resolution 2750 C (XXV).
1971
By the 1971 session, several States had been able to prepare substantial drafts on the international seabed. The Committee had
decided to form three subcommittees."9 These drafts went to Subcommittee 1 which, under the chairmanship of Dr. Seaton of Tanzania, was to deal with the question of the international seabed.
In addition to these drafts, the subcommittee received the three reports which the General Assembly had requested the Secretary
General to prepare. The first of these dealt with the possible impact of seabed mineral production on world markets. 60 Its tone
was generally optimistic, regarding the market in manganese as the
only market likely to be seriously affected within the foreseeable
future. Both the Secretary General and UNCTAD 61 recognized
that this was a question of great importance which would require
much further study-a feeling shared by members of the subcommittee, some of whom thought that the report had underestimated
the problem. The subcommittee decided not to formulate specific
proposals on the basis of the second report6 2 which dealt with
problems of land-locked countries, but to keep the matter under
constant consideration. In connection with the third report63 on
the sharing of proceeds and other benefits, the importance of nonfinancial benefits such as direct participation and the need for training nationals of developing countries was stressed.
The draft articles submitted by Tanzania6 4 were a striking contrast with those submitted by the western States at the previous
session.6 5 While permitting exploitation by member States and
58. The Communist bloc voted against the resolution.

59. 26 U.N. GAOR, Perm. Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SR.45, at 7 (1971).
The subcommittees dealt with the international seabed area (SC.I), the
comprehensive list of subjects for the Law of the Sea Conference (SC.II),
and pollution and scientific research (SC.III).
60. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/36.
61. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.I/L.5 (UNCTAD statement to SC.I, Aug.
13, 1971).
62. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/37/Corr.1 & Corr.2.
63. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/38/Corr.1.
64. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/33.
65. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/49 (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador,

companies under their sponsorship through a licensing system, it
also gave the Authority the power to undertake exploitation itself;
in either event, all activities related to the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the area were to be subject to regulation
by the Authority. In addition, the Authority was to provide for
the sharing of financial and other benefits, and establish measures
to eliminate fluctuations in the prices of land-based minerals resulting from the exploitation of ithe seabed. Even this did not go so
far as the 13-power draft which was based on the opinion of
its sponsors that "the concept of a licensing or concession system
is . . . inconsistent with the principle of the common heritage."
While preserving the "rights and legitimate interests of coastal
States," provision is made for the establishment of a strong Authority with exclusive jurisdiction over the area. The Authority would
undertake exploration and exploitation activities in the area, although it might do so through a system of contracts or through
the establishment of joint ventures. In addition to the duty of distributing benefits, the Authority is to take all necessary measures,
including suspension of production and price-fixing, in order to protect developing countries and exporters of raw materials from any
adverse economic effects of seabed production. Under the Tanzanian draft, this function would be performed by a less powerful
three to five man board elected by the Assembly of the Authority.
An interesting difference between this text and that submitted
by Tanzania is that the latter gives the greater power to an 18State council. The Assembly is limited to a supervisory and broad
policy-making role. The 13-power draft, on the other hand, gives
the Assembly the power to discuss and decide on any questions
within the scope of the Authority, and to direct the 35-State Council
(elected, like the Tanzanian Council, with due regard to the principle of equitable geographical representation) on such matters, and
gives the Council less power than its Tanzanian counterpart.
None of the other drafts adopted such a radical stance as the two
mentioned above. A seven-power draft submitted by geographioally-disadvantaged States 6 had interesting features. It proposed
a composite criterion for fixing the outer edge of the national seabed, this being either the 200-meter isobath or 40 miles from the
baseline of the territorial sea, and required equal numbers of primarily coastal States and primarily noncoastal States in any organ
Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad, Tobago,
Uruguay, and Venezuela).
66. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/55 (Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Nepal, Netherlands, and Singapore).
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of the Authority in which not all member States were represented.
However, its plans for the Authority, although allowing joint ventures, direct exploitation and marketing by the Authority, were
vague and relatively conservative. Even the magnificently idealistic Maltese Draft Ocean Space Treaty 67 based its system of seabed
exploitation on exclusive licenses issued on a nondiscriminatory
basis. Permanent seats on the Council would be granted to coastal
States with either a population exceeding 90 million inhabitants or
certain other attributes which would, in general, favor the developed western States. Similarly, the Canadian working paper6 8 emphasized that progress towards even the limited objective of giving
the Authority the power to exploit the area should be very slow.
Although it gave the "resource management commission" of the Authority the power to exercise control over the method and volume
of production, this was only for the purpose of preventing waste
of resources.
The position of the United Kingdom remained conservative. It
proposed a licensing system within the area beyond the trusteeship
zone, a suggestion made the previous year in the American draft
treaty. The Authority would possess limited powers in relation to
the licenses. Regarding the Authority, the United Kingdom proposals observed that
just as it would be appropriate to give developing States a special
position on any institutions of the Authority which might be set
up for the purpose of distributing sea bed benefits, so it would be
necessary to make special provision on the Council for those States
with an established sea bed technology, who have a special contribution to make in organising sea bed activity and without whose
support no international regime in this field would be viable. 69
Finally, the papers submitted by the U.S.S.R. 70 and Poland 71
demonstrated a reluctance to see a "strong" regime with a comprehensive Authority, which was consistent with the conservatism
previously noted.
By contrast with this activity in the Committee, the General Assembly took little action. The Chairman of the Committee outlined
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

U.N.
U.N.
U.N.
U.N.
U.N.

Doc.
Doc.
Doc.
Doc.
Doc.

A/AC.138/53.
A/AC.138/59.
A/AC.138/46.
A/AC.138/43.
A/AC.138/44.

to the First Committee 72 some of the trends and interest groups
which were emerging, but the Assembly confined itself to adopting,
on the recommendation of the First Committee, resolution 2881
(XXVI) which added China and four other States 78 to the Committee, and noted with satisfaction the progress of the Committee.
1972
In 1972, activity in the Seabed Committee moved away from the
work of Subcommittee I towards the questions relating to living
resources and preservation of the marine environment under consideration by the other two subcommittees. These preoccupations
were7also evident outside the Committee; for instance, in the Declaration of Santo Domingo and the Yaound6 conclusions on the one
hand, and the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
and the London Conference on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes, on the other. 74 It seems likely that developing States were coming to regard extended claims to national
jurisdiction as serving their immediate interests better than the possibility of a strong international seabed regime. This changing conception of the importance of the international area was reflected,
in the increasing emphasis given to the nonfinancial benefits arising
from the exploitation of the area, and the fears of some geographically-disadvantaged States that such wide limits would severely
diminish the potential benefits of the common heritage. These
fears prompted the introduction of a proposal 7 5 that the Secretary
General should be requested to prepare a study of the economic
implications of various proposed limits of the international seabed
area. This proposal, although opposed in the Committee on the
grounds that it both prejudged the question of limits and was simply a device for opposing the claims to broad coastal jurisdiction,
was accepted in a modified form by the General Assembly.
The major contributions of Subcommittee I to the preparation
for the Conference were its consideration of the further report of
the Secretary General on the economic implications of seabed min72. 26 U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm., U.N. Doe. A/C.1/PV.1843, at 6 (1971).
73. The First Committee had proposed three other States, to be appointed
by the Chairman of the First Committee in consultation with regional
groups, with due regard to the interest of underrepresented groups.
74. See, e.g., Fleischler, Pollution for Seaborne Sources, 3 NEw DmEcTIONS IN =s LAW op m SEA 78 (1973); Nelson, The Patrimonial Sea, 22
INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 668 (1973).
75. 27 U.N. GAOR, Perm. Comm., U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/81 (1972). See
also the Netherlands' proposal concerning the intermediate zone, id., U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/SC.I/L9.
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eral production,7 6 and the preparation by a 33-State working group
of texts illustrating areas of agreement and disagreement, 77 although neither activity led to any significant changes in national
positions.
The General Assembly confined itself to procedural matters when
considering the question of the seabed, and resolved to convene the
first session of the Conference in 1973. In addition, the Secretary
General was requested to prepare studies on the implications of the
various proposed limits of jurisdiction both for the International
Area and for riparian States. These resolutions constituted resolution 3029 (XXVII), adopted on December 18, 1972.
1973
The 1973 session of the Committee was devoted to preparing for
the Conference. In Subcommittee I, the Working Group on ,the
international regime and machinery continued its preparaton of a
text indicating areas of agreement and disagreement.

The text

7s

Committee79

was annexed to the final report of the Seabed
and
was to form the basis for the work of the Conference. There were
texts submitted to the Committee which reiterated established positions. An example is the draft articles on the rights of land-locked
States submitted by Bolivia8 0 and by a group of seven land-locked
States.8 ' Also, there was a paper -from the Netherlands82 on the
concept of an intermediate zone where coastal State jurisdiction
would be subject to international rules, and where there would be
review and supervision by international bodies and a sharing of
benefits with the international community. The Committee also
received a strong affirmation of belief by the Organization of African Unity in a regime for the seabed which, through an Authority
with comprehensive powers, would "give full meaning to the concept of the common heritage of mankind. ''8 3 In addition, the Secre76. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/73.
77. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/L.18/Add.3.
78. 28 U.N. GAOR, Perm. Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/94/Add.1 (1973).
79. 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973).
80. 28 U.N. GAOR, Perm. Comm-, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/92 (1973).
81. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/93 (Afghanistan, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Mali, Nepal, and Zambia).
82. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/86.
83. Declaration on the issues of the Law of the Sea, id., U.N. Doc..
A/AC..138/89 OAU (Addis Ababa).

tary General provided a report on the economic8 4significance of the
various limits proposed for national jurisdiction.
Perhaps the most significant development in 1973 was the realization of the difficulty which would be experienced on agreeing upon
a system for taking decisions in the Conference. Discussion of the
question began in March in the Seabed Committee, and was continued at length in the First Committee later that year. However,
as is well known, there was a fundamental disagreement between
those States who counseled caution and objected to decisions being
taken by numerical majorities regardless of the political weight of
the opposition, and those who thought that progressive legislation
85
for the seas required that there should be no minority veto.

Tii CONFERENCE
The debate on decision-making occupied all of the first session
of the Conference, which took place in New York in December 1973,
and the first week of the second session in Caracas. 0 Finally,
there was agreement on a procedure which allows a vote to be taken
when attempts at reaching consensus have failed.87 So far as the
substantive work of the Caracas session was concerned, there was
renewed activity among the developed States. The United States
put forward a paper8 8 which criticized some of the Secretary General's predictions of the economic impact of seabed minerals 89 and
argued that complex international bodies to regulate production
"may result in greater economic costs to all mankind than the benefits they are designed to achieve." This was followed by a draft "°
containing detailed provisions governing the award and conditions
of mining licenses. Prospecting would be unregulated, and mining
subject to nondiscriminatory licenses awarded on a first-come, firstserved basis, until the Convention enter force, when a bidding procedure is instituted. The Authority would have little or no power
to impose further requirements on an operator once the license is
issued. The license is made freely transferable provided only that
the transferee agrees to comply with the provisions of the Conven84. Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/87; cf. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/90 (1973).

85. See Vignes, Will the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea Work
According to the Consensus Rule?, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 119 (1975).
86. The second session was to have been held in Santiago, Chile (Res.
3029 (XXVII)), but was moved to Caracas following the overthrow of the
Chilean government in September 1973.
87. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/30/Rev.1 (1974).
88. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.5 (1974).
89. The most recent report is U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25 (1974).
90. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1I/L.6 (1974). On this and the other draft
conditions, see U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/SR.14 (1974).
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tion and, if the transferee is not a State, is sponsored by a Contracting Party.
Similar draft conditions were proposed by eight EEC States 91
and Japan.92 There are several matters of detail on which these
drafts differed from the American proposal, the most interesting
being that competing applications for licenses are not settled by
competitive bidding. In the Japanese draft, selection by the Authority takes into account the equitable distribution of contracts
among prospective contractors and the import needs of parties and
in particular of developing parties. In the EEC draft, selection is
made by "objective criteria" which remain to be determined, but
appear likely to follow the "equitable distribution of contracts" approach.
The draft conditions of exploration and exploitation submitted
by the Group of 7793 were quite different. The conditions were
less detailed, therefore leaving greater discretion with the Authority. In some matters of substance, wider powers were expressly
given to the Authority. For example, the Authority would determine from time to time the areas in which exploration and exploitation would take place, rather than leaving the initiative to operators; the Authority would be entitled to revise, suspend or cancel
contracts where there is a radical change in circumstances, rather
than only where there is a gross violation of the operator's obligation; rights and obligations under the contract would not be transferrable without the consent of the Authority, and there is a provision for the continuous transfer to the Authority not only of "raw
data," as in the "western" texts, but also of "technology and knowhow" which would presumably include the means of interpreting
that data. Most significantly, the draft, following the compromise
advanced by the Group of 77 during the informal sessions, 94 pro91. U.N. Doc. A/COiNF.62/C.1/L.8 (1974)

(Belgium, Denmark, France,

Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom).
92. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.1I/L.9 (1974).
93. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.7 (1974).
94. Working Paper C.1I/CPR.4, included in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1I/L.3

(1974).

See Adede, The System for ExpZoitation of the "Common Heritage

of Mankind" at the CaracasConference, 69 Am. J. IN 'L L. 31 (1975); Amer-

asinghe, Basic PrinciplesRelating to the InternationalRegime of the Oceans
at the Caracas Session of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference,
6 3. MAR. L. & Comnw. 213, 235 (1975).

vided that although all exploitation of the international area would
be conducted directly by the Authority, this might be done through
service contracts or any other means which preserved direct and
effective control by the Authority at all times.
The debates of Committee I at Caracas did little more than clarify
the established differences between the national positions. The
general debate which occupied the first week consisted in a rehearsal of positions ranging from the assertion that
only a regime providing the necessary safeguards to subordinate
the interests of individual States, groups of States or private enterprises to the interest of the whole community
would be consistent
with the concept of the common heritage 95

to the assertion that a system based upon anything other than licensing "would not only deprive a State of its lawful rights to the
resources but would also enable a considerable number of capitalist
monopolies to obtain large profits from their exploitation."'00
After the first week, the debate moved on to consider the Basic
Principles, with particular emphasis on article nine which dealt
with the question of who should exploit the area. It was in connection with article nine that the Chairman of the informal meeting
reported to the Committee that the Group of 77 proposal represented "an event of major significance and one that had perhaps
marked a turning point" 97 in the Committee's work. Certainly it
appeared from the general debate which preceded the informal
meetings that the developing States were becoming aware that, regardless of the legal powers of the Authority, only a handful of
entities in the world possessed the technology necessary to begin
exploitation and that the regime would therefore have to secure
their cooperation. At the same time, the developed States were
coming to recognize that the complete freedom of exploitation
formerly enjoyed beyond national jurisdiction could not form the
basis of a generally acceptable regime, and that the overwhelming
majority of States demanded an Authority with powers extending
beyond the issue of licenses. As the Sri Lankan delegate had remarked at the beginning of the session, "the main difference between the systems related to the degree to which the new organization would control the activities of the entity carrying out explora98
tion and exploitation.1
95. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.I/SR.3 (1974) (Trinidad and Tobago).
96. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.l/SR.& (1974)

(U.S.S.R.).

97. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.l/SR.9 (1974) (Mr. Pinto).
.98. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.l/SR.2 (1974).
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Apart from the reduction of this question from a matter of principle to a matter of degree, and a rereading of the alternative texts
on the basic principles which clarified the remaining differences,
there was little progress in the Committee or in the formal meetings
and working group. Towards the end of the session, the Committee
considered the economic implications of seabed exploitation, again
without reaching any conclusion. However, the working papers
from the United States99 and from Chile, 10 0 both of which discussed the reports from the Secretary General and UNCTAD, 1°1
and the debates themselves, went some way towards clarifying
the
02
basic approaches to controlling the impact of seabed minerals.1
There was considerable diplomatic activity between the second
and third sessions of the Conference, and there was a guarded optimism that the Geneva session would be able to produce the core
of an agreement. The First Committee had before it a comparative
table'0 3 of the proposals from the United States, Group of 77, the
eight European Powers, and Japan. At the second meeting, the
U.S.S.R. introduced a further working document'0

4

on conditions

of exploitation. This document adhered to the previously stated
Soviet view that exploitation should be conducted by States, who
may transfer their rights to national or juridical persons under
their jurisdiction, on the basis of "contracts" (which differ little,
if at all, from licenses) with the Authority. The proposal certainly
goes some way towards a compromise with the proposals of the
Group of 77. For instance, the Authority would be entitled to participate in exploitation, and may reserve areas, though not whole
regions, of the seabed to itself. Where more than one State applies
for a contract relating to an area, the Authority is to have regard,
99. See note 88 supra.
100. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.11 (1974).
101. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25 (1974); U.N. Doc A/CONF.62/32 (1974).

For a brief review of these reports, see U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.2
(1974).
102. See the summary given by the Chairman, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
C.1/SR.14 (1974).
103. Proposals Regarding Conditions of Exploration and Exploitation,

OP/Working Paper No. 2, First Committee Working Group, summarizing
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.l/L.6

(1974);

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.7

(1974); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.8 (1974); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/
L.9 (1974).
104. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.12 (1975); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/

SR.19 (1975).

inter alia, to the number of contracts already obtained by the competing States and to the importance of the contract for their economies. Preference would be given to developing countries which are
to a "certain extent" dependent on obtaining the contract.
In addition to the Soviet draft, Czechoslavakia, on behalf of the
Group of Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States,
submitted two papers. The first 05 one required the net annual
revenue arising from exploitation to be distributed as follows: ten
percent to a price stabilization fund, 35 percent to all developing
countries, 231 percent among land-locked States, 12% percent
among disadvantaged States and 20 percent among all States. Of
these, all except the first and last categories are to be distributed
according to a formula based upon population and per capita income. The second paper' 0 6 provides that at least two-fifths of the
members of the Council, and of any other organ of the Authority
in which not all Member States are represented, shall be representatives of land-locked and geographically-disadvantaged States.
These represent a new phase in the demands of geographically-disadvantaged States, which had hitherto been concerned mainly with
establishing the principle of their access to and participation in the
resources of the international area.
The most important document to emerge from the session was
the Working Group paper on Basic Conditions of Exploration and
Exploitation'0 7 which sought to present a unified text on the contractual joint venture system for the Authority which the Committee had been studying, 0 8 and taking account of the major concerns
of delegations. 0 9 Although this paper had been the subject of
wide consultation, it was not a negotiated compromise, but rather
a device to facilitate further negotiation.
This paper need not be considered here in detail because it forms
the Annex to the Single Negotiating Text. However, it is important
to note firstly, that the Chairman of the Working Group thought
that the paper was acceptable to the Working Group, with the exception of two matters relating to the reservation of portions of the
area for the Authority's use, and secondly, that the paper was expressly based upon the conditions proposed by the Group of 77.
105. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.13 (1975).
106. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.14 (1975).

107. Basic Conditions of Exploration and Exploitation, First Committee
Working Group, CP/cab.12 (Apr. 9, 1975).

108. Information Note on Joint Ventures, First Committee Working

Group, C.1/Working Paper No. 5 (Apr. 8, 1975).
109. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.1I/SR.20 (1975).
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TBE TEXT

The text submitted by Mr. Engo as Chairman of Committee I
is rather different in its tone from the other two parts of the Informal Single Negotiating Text. It makes little attempt to produce
a set of articles balanced either by the inclusion of articles representative of those submitted by all interest groups, or by adopting
the draft articles facing the least opposition. Instead, the text adheres fairly consistently to the line advanced by the Group of 77.
Although the text is merely a device to facilitate negotiation, it
is important to realize that the developing States have made significant progress already by having so influenced the debate on the
international area as to have future negotiations conducted on the
basis of their views.
The text provides for an International Seabed Authority which
would govern activities in the area with the aim of fostering a
healthy world economy while protecting the economies of developing States which already export minerals to be produced from the
seabed, and promote the orderly development and rational management of the area. The Authority would be responsible for the
equitable distribution of benefits, both financial and nonfinancial,
arising from the exploitation of the area, paying particular attention to the position of developing States. Expl6ration, exploitation,
and the marketing of resources would be undertaken both directly
by the Authority (acting through the Enterprise which is one of
its subsidiary organs) and by States Parties, or entities under their
jurisdiction, with which the Authority has concluded agreements
under which they remain at all times subject to the direct and effective control of the Authority. The functions of the Authority
would be discharged by the 36-State Council, subject to the policy
guidelines laid down by the Assembly to which all member States
belong. Members of the Council would be chosen, paying regard
to the equitable distribution of seats among the major geographical
regions.
In addition to the Enterprise, the Authority has two other subsidiary organs-the Technical Commission and the Economic Planning Commission, both of which advise the Council, which is served
by a small secretariat. A tribunal would be established to which
either party to a dispute arising in relation to the area might have

recourse if other methods of peaceful settlement are not agreed
upon.
The regime can be conveniently discussed under the following
headings: General Principles of the Regime; Research and Exploration; Distribution of Benefits; Transfer of Technology; Safety and
Pollution; Composition of the International Authority; and Dispute
Settlement. Before doing so, the question of the limits of the international area must be considered.

Limits
The Committee II Single Negotiating Text provides, in article
62, that national jurisdiction over the seabed extends throughout
the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of
the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 miles from the baseline of the territorial sea where the margin does not extend up to
that distance. This would have the effect of including over 40 percent of the seabed within national jurisdiction, compared with about
36 percent under a single limit of 200 miles. The wider limit is
thought to bring almost 100 percent of offshore oil within national
jurisdiction, whereas the 200-mile limit might leave between five
percent and 15 percent within the international area.
By way of accommodating the interests of geographically-disadvantaged States, the Committee II text goes on to provide, in
article 69, that a proportion of -thevalue or volume of production
at sites beyond the 200-mile limit shall be paid to the International
Authority, which then distributes this on an equitable basis, taking
the needs and interests of developing countries into account. This
might seem a rather cumbersome procedure, especially when only
a handful of States are expected to gain from the extended limit,
and there is a strong case for adopting a simple limit of 200 miles
for seabed jurisdiction. Firstly, the outer edge of the margin is
difficult to determine. 110 A limit of 200 miles is not only easier
for the coastal State to administer, but is also a more convenient
limit for seamen seeking to discover whether or not they are within
the jurisdiction of the coastal State. Secondly, since the waters
above the margin but beyond the 200-mile limit would be "high
seas," the coastal State would enjoy jurisdiction over foreign vessels
only for the purpose of protecting their sovereign rights over the
exploration and exploitation of the seabed. Such limited jurisdic110. See H. HEDBERG, NATIONAL INTERNATIONAL JURIsDIcTIONAL BoUNDARY
OcEA FILooR (1972); Orlin, Offshore Boundaries: Engineering and
Economic Aspects, 3 Ocsw DEVE &INT'L L.J. 87 (1975).
oN TH
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tion is likely to give rise not only to disputes over the legality of
interference with foreign ships, but also to "creeping jurisdiction"
resulting in the subsuming of the area within the EEZ.
If an acceptable regime for the international area is agreed upon,
could not the coastal States' interests be accommodated by giving
them preferential rights in the margin beyond 200 miles? It is arguable that any advantage gained by exploiting that outer margin
under national jurisdiction, with a proportion of profits going to
the Authority (rather than under the international regime, with
a proportion of profits going to the contractor-State) is outweighed
by the greater stability inherent in a single limit of 200 miles for
maritime jurisdiction.
General Principlesof the Regime
The first 19 articles of the text set out the general principles of
the regime. These are of more than preambulatory effect, since
the text as a whole is in the nature of a "framework treaty." Questions on the legality of actions taken by the Authority, and disputes
arising out of the regime, will almost certainly be settled on the
basis of these principles."1
The developing States have been
urging that there should be a regime based upon an international
Authority implementing such general principles. If the premise of
"democratic" government of international areas and resources is accepted, there is much to be said in favor of such a move away from
"quasi-contractual" international agreements, and the flexibility
which that move entails. Although such articles oftentimes secure
agreement more easily because of the range of interpretation which
they allow (which in turn makes them virtually impossible to enforce), it may be that the provision of a Tribunal which would be
likely to base its decisions upon these principles will result in them
being as closely negotiated as the more detailed provisions of the
text.
The area is declared by article three to be the "common heritage
of mankind," following the terms of resolution 2749 (XXV). The
consequence of this, according to paragraph one of the Annex, is
that "all rights in the resources are vested in the Authority on be111. Cf. para. 18 of the Basic Conditions, Annex 1 of the Text, U.N. Doe.

A/CONF.62/WP.8/Pt.1 (1975).

half of mankind as a whole." This seems, however, to depend upon
an interpretation of the concept of "common heritage" which in the
past has not been universally accepted. 12 Such a far-reaching
result is not obtained even with -thecombined effect ,of article four
which provides that there shall be no claim to sovereignty over
the area and that rights can only be acquired in accordance with
the Convention, article six which provides that no activities in the
Area shall be carried out except in accordance with the provisions
of the Convention, and article seven which Tequires all activities
to be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole. If it is
intended to vest title to the resources in the Authority, this should
be done in the body of the convention.
The definition of "activities in the Area" in article one is something of a compromise: the term is defined as "all activities of exploration of the Area and of the exploitation of its resources, as
well as other associated activities in the area including scientific
research." This definition is not wide enough to encompass activities such as the laying of cables and pipelines unconnected with
the exploitation or exploration of the Area. To this extent, the
definition will disappoint those developing States which sought a
comprehensive regime for the seabed. On the other hand, the inclusion of research in the regime will cause concern to States such
as the United Kingdom and U.S.S.R., which have often declared
their support for the freedom of scientific research. 1 8 However,
it may be that the substantive rules on research are acceptable to
both groupings."" With the exception of these activities, and
since the superjacent waters remain high seas (article 15), the traditional "freedom of the seas" remains.
The "common heritage of mankind" has the special meaning
which it had (at least in the eyes of the majority of States) throughout the United Nations discussion of the concept. Thus article
seven provides that
[a]etivities shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a
whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether
coastal or land-locked, and taking into particular consideration the
interests and needs of the developing countries.
Article nine requires the development of the area to be carried
out not only in such a manner as to foster the healthy development
of the world economy but also so as to
112. See Amerasinghe, supra note 94, at 218-19; cf. notes 30 & 31 supra.
113. See 1 UNCLOS Il OmciAL REcoRDs 69 (1975) (U.S.S.R.); id. at 111
(United Kingdom).
114. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Pt.III, arts. 16, 18, 49 (1975); Marine
Scientific Research, id., art. 25.
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avoid or minimize any adverse effects on the revenues and economies of the developing countries, resulting from a substantial decline in their export earnings from minerals and other raw materials originating from their territory which are also derived from
the Area.
This discrimination in favor of developing States runs throughout

the text. If it is thought that the parceling out of benefits from
the exploitation of an area of res communis should be an occasion

for the redress of existing inequalities, this is quite properly so.
Although developed exporting States will also feel the effect of seabed mineral production, many of them, unlike developing States,
will have the opportunity to participate in the wealth of the seabed through the profits on service contracts and joint ventures with
the Authority. In any event, only blind acceptance of the "sovereign equality of States" could ignore the distinction between the
interests of developed, and the needs of developing States. Allied
to this notion are the universally accepted principles that the area
should be reserved for peaceful purposes (article eight) and that
activities shall generally be in accordance with the provisions of
the United Nations charter (article five). This does not, of course,
imply any new limitation on activity in the superjacent waters.
The principle governing responsibility for operations in the Area
is an interesting insight into the limitations of the regime. Under
article 17
[e]very State shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities
in the Area, whether undertaken by government agencies, or nongovernmental entities or persons under its jurisdiction, or acting on
its behalf, shall be carried out in conformity with the provisions
Damage caused by such activities shall
of this Convention ....
entail liability on the part of the State ....

This article recognizes that the Authority, despite the provision for
a staff of inspectors (article 40) is not likely to be able to police
the area itself, but will depend upon States to do so. It implies
that this will be on the basis of flag-state jurisdiction. This has
,certain weaknesses. First, it is readily foreseeable that the "flag of
convenience" and "tax haven" problems will arise, especially where
multinational enterprises have the added incentive of establishing
themselves in countries which will be given preferential treatment
under the proposed regime. This will result in an even more serious lack of control over convenience vessels than at present, since
the activities will, by definition, be taking place at least 200 miles

from the nearest coast which probably will not be the coast of the
flag State. On the other hand, this does not imply that any State
will find it easy to supervise effectively the operators for whom
they are responsible.
Second, the high entry price into the deep-sea mining market
makes it likely that many operators will be consortia of persons
of different nationalities, and it may be difficult to decide which
State is to be responsible. Article 17(2) provides that "[a] group
of States ... acting together shall be jointly and severally responsible ... ." This, however, does not unambiguously cover the situations described above. Also, this provision seems to be at variance
with paragraph 5 of the Annex, which requires nonstate entities
to be "sponsored" by a party before the Authority may conclude
contracts with them-the obvious inference being that the sponsoring State should be responsible.
Third, vessels of several flags may be involved in an operation
in the area. For example, a ship of State A unloads provisions
onto an installation of State B. It would seem desirable to fix one
State with responsibility for an entire operation in the area. The
simplest method seems to be to require one State to sponsor an
entire operation and sort out liability with any other States involved. This would also simplify the problem of the equitable
distribution of contracts among States. In addition, enforcement
could be made more effective if port State jurisdiction were
adopted, giving the Authority the right to proceed against miscreant
vessels wherever they put into port.115
There are a number of miscellaneous principles which impose
upon the Authority the obligation to take "appropriate" or "necessary" measures. Examples include: the duty to protect the marine
environment (article 12) and human life (article 13); to "promote"
scientific research (article ten); the participation of developing
States in activities in the area (article 18); and the transfer of
technology (article 11). Article 14 contains two provisions relating
to coastal States. The first requires due regard to be given to the
rights and legitimate interests, whatever these might be, of coastal
States where resources lie across the limits of national jurisdiction.
The second appears to recognize the right of States to take necessary measures to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent
danger to their coastlines from pollution from activities in the Area.
This latter provision is very similar to the provision in article one
115. Cf. Lowe, The Enforcement of Marine Pollution Regulations, 12 SA.
DIEGO L. REv. 624 (1975).
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of the 1969 Brussels Intervention Convention. 116 It supports the
view that States may act in such circumstances against foreign ships
or installations in pursuance of a right of self-preservation.
Research and Exploration
The Authority may conduct research itself, under contract to
other entities if it so wishes, and is to act as a center for harmonizing and coordinating scientific research (article ten). The Committee III text provides, in article 25 of the section on "Marine
Scientific Research," that States enjoy freedom of research in the
area, subject to notification to the Authority and conformity with
the provisions of the convention. The Basic Conditions permit "any
entity" to carry out a "general survey" of areas determined by the
Authority, provided that the Authority's environmental protection
regulations are met (Annex, para. 3).
It is unclear whether paragraph five of the conditions, which requires sponsorship of entities by States parties before entry into
research and exploration contracts within the Authority, is reconcilable with this freedom. It is likely that the Committee I text
intends research concerning the seabed to be subject to the Authority's control, since this is a matter brought under the regime and
therefore removed from the "freedom of the seas." However, this
would not include research relating only to the superjacent waters.
Nor would the requirements that the Authority should open areas
for general survey or "prospecting" (as the Soviet,1 17 Eightpower 1 8 and American" 9 draft conditions term it), necessarily
apply to "scientific" research.
Despite these possible concessions, this portion is unlikely to be
satisfactory to the developed States, who sought freedom of research and general survey subject only to registration with the Authority. There are, of course, clear risks of unauthorized activities
being carried on under the guise of research in coastal waters. Perhaps even greater is the danger that information gained from such
116. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 25 (1970).
117. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.12 (1975).
118. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.8 (1974).
119. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1IL.6 (1974).

research will be used to the detriment of the coastal State in, for

example, bargaining over offshore oil concessions. Yet, these considerations are less appropriate to the international area. Thus, it
might be hoped that a compromise based upon notification for "pure
research," and general survey under the Authority's control, with
into which category
the Authority having the right to determine
120
a proposed voyage falls, would be acceptable.
Evaluationand Exploration
The stage at which an identified deposit should be evaluated and
exploited was more controversial. It is now clear though, that a
regime which fails to bring these activities under its "direct and
effective control" will not gain the necessary support in the Conference. The text allows the Authority to carry out these, as all other
activities, directly, or through States parties and entities which they
The exclusion of nonparty States offers an incentive
sponsor. 12
the
convention, although this distinction was not drawn
to ratify
in the Group of 77 or the Eight-power draft conditions. The Authority is to decide which areas are to be opened for evaluation
and exploitation, although States parties may suggest suitable
areas. This may give rise to fears among developed States that
the Authority could refuse for "political" reasons to permit companies which have already invested heavily in the evaluation of certain sites to begin operations in those sites under a joint venture
agreement. This possibility could be avoided by requiring the Authority to show the existence of specific circumstances such as unreasonable danger to shipping or the marine environment before
refusing to enter into an agreement relating to a site proposed by
a State party.
The original text on basic conditions 12 2 required applicants for
joint venture contracts to apply for two alternative areas, one of
which would be chosen and reserved for exploitation by the Authority. Agreement was not possible on that scheme, and it was
omitted from the text, as was a Soviet proposal which would have
reserved part of the seabed for States to exploit with a considerable
120. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/SR.5 (1974) (Swedish delegate);
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.l/SR.2 (1974) (Sri Lankan delegate); U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.1/SR.21 (1975) (United States delegate).
121. The text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Pt.1, art. 22 (1975); ef. id.,
Annex, para. 5. Note that entitles "effectively controlled by their nationals"
are included. These would not necessarily be under the State's "enforcement" or "legislative" jurisdiction.
122. Note 107 supra. See also article 5 in U.N. Doc. A/CONr.62/C.1/L.12
(1975).
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degree of autonomy. 123 The omission was the result of a failure
to agree upon a provision on this matter, rather than an agreement
to omit the matter, which remains to be decided.
The authority has freedom to decide upon the form of agreement
which it will enter into with other entities (article 22). Although
the text only contains provisions relating to contractual ventures,
this freedom was regarded as important by the Group of 77.124
When entering into contracts, the Authority's main obligation is
"to promote and encourage activities in the Area and to secure the
maximum financial and other benefits from them" (article 23).
Nonfinancial benefits will include the training of personnel and
transfer of technology. It is foreseeable that, particularly in the
early stages of operation, the maximum benefit to the Authority
may be secured at the expense of the maximum revenues to be
distributed among the parties; however, this is a matter which can,
perhaps, only be resolved by agreement within the functioning Authority.
Providing that the applicant is qualified according to the criteria
laid down by the Authority (Annex, para. 7) and the financial arrangements 25 and other requirements are met, the Authority
may not, in the absence of competing applications, refuse to enter
into a contract (Annex, para. 8). Competing applications are to
be resolved on a "competitive" basis. The Japanese and Soviet
draft conditions sought resolution by consultation and agreement
between competitors. In the absence of agreement, the Soviet draft
provided for selection by the Council on the basis of criteria such
as the importance of obtaining the contract to the applicant State's
economy, the number of contracts held by the applicant, and the
efficacy of planned antipollution measures. The Japanese draft
would give the contract, in the absence of agreement, to the highest
bidder in auction; that is the only method of selection proposed
in the American draft. The Annex to the text leaves the Authority
with wide discretion in this, as in all other matters, with the principles of the Convention as a guide (Annex, para. 8 (c)).
123. Speech by Mr. Pinto, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/SR.20 (1975).
124. See the statement by Mr. DeSoto, Chairman of the Group of 77, U.N.

Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1I/SR.20 (1975).
125. Annex, para. 9 (d) has not yet been drawn up.

There is one objective criterion proposed, which would limit any
State to a certain number of contracts each year (Annex, para. 8 (f),
(g)). The aim is to prevent any one State from dominating the
exploitation of the seabed, and from using the profits on contract
to increase its share of the benefits arising from the area. Although the first point may be satisfied by the limits on contracts
(which was also proposed in the Eight-power and Soviet drafts) this
will not ensure equality of benefits; for example, one contract, in
comparison with another may include more activities in relation
to an area, or may result in higher profits to the contractor. This
might also have the effect of encouraging the "incorporation of convenience," where a company seeking access to the area feels that
its "natural" State of incorporation is less likely to successfully
sponsor the company than, say, a developing State, because it has
already sponsored a number of contractors. This, of course, is not
necessarily a bad thing; if the developing States can attract such
enterprises and can control them in the interests of the host State,
such States may actually benefit. It is therefore arguably better
to accept this consequence of limiting the number of contracts and
concentrate on developing means to ensure that such companies do
not act contrary to their host's interests.120 The possibility of
profits from contracts unbalancing the equitable distribution of
benefits is evident and provision will need to be made to avoid this
while allowing a reasonable profit to the companies concerned. In
particular, some such provision would be necessary if the Authority
fails to achieve early independence from the technology of the few
corporations capable of exploiting the area.
The detailed conditions of the contracts are left for the Authority
to determine (Annex, para. 12), but a number of conditions have
received special consideration. Chief of these is the provision of
some control on production in order to minimize any deleterious
economic effects of seabed production. This is now regarded as an
essential component of the regime by the Group of 77, and the debate is over the best method of achieving this objective. 1 2 7 The
problem is, of course, that an effect which is detrimental to some
States, or interest groups within States, such as a fall in the price
of minerals, is beneficial to other States or interest groups. The
main fear of developed States is that interference with production
126. See Multinational Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc.

ST/ECA/190 (1973); Report on the First Session of the Commission on
Transnational Corporations, 59 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 12 (1975).
127. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/26 (1974); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.5
(1974); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.l/L.11 (1974); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/
SR.20 (1975) (Statement of the Chilean delegate).
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levels will discourage investment in the area, and restriction of the
entry of the minerals into the world market will deprive the users
of the minerals of the benefits which they might reasonably expect
to gain from the exploitation of the area.
"Stabilization" of mineral markets could be undertaken within
the Authority both by including provisions in the original contract
and by regulating operators after the contract has been concluded.
Many States would argue that the power to do this is inherent in
the "direct and effective control" which the Authority exercises
over activities in the area. Agreement might be reached on a compromise which would give the Authority the right to regulate the
flow of minerals onto the market, either physically or by pricefixing, pursuant to an agreement concluded outside the Convention-for example a separate commodity agreement covering the
most economically significant metal recovered from the area. Such
agreements are likely to become increasingly common if the move
towards the new international economic order continues. This compromise could allow full production at the site of exploitation, and
regulate the commodity in the context of wider agreements on raw
materials production.
There appears to be considerable agreement on the principle that
contractors should have reasonable security of tenure. The period
would be decided in accordance with the necessity for giving the
contractor sufficient security to plan the orderly execution of the
contract while keeping contract periods fairly short so that their
terms can be renegotiated on expiry in the light of experience
gained from earlier operations (Annex, para. 19). Similarly, there
should be little difficulty in reconciling present differences on the
size of areas in respect of which contracts should be awarded
(Annex, para. 18), or on requirements for a minimum level of activity under the contract (Annex, para. 20). Contracts can be suspended or cancelled for gross violations of the Convention (Annex,
para. 14).
The Authority may explore and exploit the Area itself, acting
through its Enterprise (article 35). These activities are subject to
the above conditions, and any projected activity must be shown to
result in optimum benefits to the Authority (Annex, para. 4). The
resources produced are to be made available to States generally at
not less than the market price (Annex, para. 4(e)). Marketing is

to be regulated in accordance with what was article ten of the
draft articles considered at the Committee's informal meetings, 128
and is now article nine of the Text. Developing States would be
given "preferential access or favorable terms to such minerals or
products" (article 20(xi)). However, it will be necessary to ensure
that those States and enterprises actually producing the resources
have access to a reasonable share of the products derived from the
seabed. Again, this might appropriately be dealt with by a commodity agreement outside the Convention. The Authority's ability
to enter into such activities will, of course, depend upon the acquisition of the necessary skills, and those possessing these skills may,
as is noted below, be unwilling to transfer them to the Authority.
Until the Authority gains the independence which possession of
these skills confers, it will have to employ personnel, equipment
and services in order to permit the Enterprise to begin operations.
Article 22 requires that the Authority identify as soon as possible
ten economically viable mining sites and exploit these through
joint ventures. This goes some way to meet the fears of western
States that the Authority would unduly delay activities in the area,
although by the time that the Convention comes into force there
may be more than ten consortia prepared to embark upon these
activities. Like all joint ventures, these ten schemes would be financed by the contractors concerned and not by the Authority. The
contractor would be repaid and take his share of the proceeds (Annex, para. 9) once production began. The Secretary General's report stated that
the medium estimate of the take from a single mining operation of
3 million tons per year would be $96 million. This would still
allow the miners a 36% return on total investment after payment

of the Authority's share.... [T]he average return on investment
in mining in the United States of America ... was 10.4% in
.1972.129

Of course, this leaves open the question of the conditions under
which these first operations would take place. Without agreement
upon these conditions, this proposal is not likely to satisfy the developed States whose companies are potential contractors. Since
the Convention is unlikely to enter force until the 1980's, these
States' interests require an "interim regime" to govern the area before that time. If such a regime is not negotiated in the near future,
there are likely to be increasing pressures on States to take unilateral action in order to permit operators such as Deep Sea Ven128. U.N. Doe. AICONF.62/C.1/L.3 (1974).
129. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25 (1974); 3 UNCLOS OFmcrAL REcoIms 171

(1975).
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tures to begin exploiting the area and start to gain some return
on their massive investment in deep-sea technology. This problem
is under close study, but there are no signs of an emerging agreement at present.
Distributionof Benefits
Central to the idea of the common heritage of mankind is the
distribution of benefits derived from the international area. Although it has frequently been stated that "benefit" should not be
understood to mean simply money, the text only makes clear provision for the distribution of revenue and for the transfer of technology. So far as revenues are concerned, any amounts left after meeting the expenses and costs of the Authority, which may include
not only administrative costs but also "the expenditure of the
Enterprise, to the extent that it cannot be met out of the Enterprise's own revenues and other receipts" (article 44), are to be paid
into a "Special Fund." The extent to which these costs and expenses are to be met from the proceeds, rather than out of contributions from members, is determined by the Assembly on a recommendation from the Council, but the very idea of an expensive machinery subsidized by member States is anathema to the western
States.
Amounts in the special fund are to be "made available" in accordance with the Assembly's criteria for the equitable sharing of benefits. As was noted above, the Czechoslovakian delegation introduced at Geneva a proposal for dividing States into various groups,
each to receive a proportion of the special fund. Within each group,
the monies would be distributed in proportion to the following
formula:
global per capita income
population of State
per capital income of State
global population
It may also be questioned whether the "thin spread" of revenues
which would result from the formula is more beneficial than the
distribution of revenues on a more selective basis, perhaps giving
a substantial proportion of a year's "profits" for the funding of some
regional project. In any event, this is a question which the Group
of 77 is likely to want to remain in the hands of the Assembly,
and not fixed by a rigid formula in the treaty.

Great importance has been attached to the provisions on the
transfer of technology, it being recognized that the know-how necessary for exploiting the resources of the international seabed is
possessed by a handful of enterprises in the developed States. The
subject has received much attention in recent years not only from
the General Assembly, 130 but also from UNCTAD and other international bodies. The Secretariat produced a report 1 1 on the specific problems of acquiring and transferring marine technology for
the Caracas session of the Conference. The text, in article 15, imposes a general obligation on States and the Authority to promote
the transfer of technology relating to the area. Two particular
methods are the training of personnel from developing countries,
and the facilitation of access to patented and nonpatented technology.
The training of personnel is unlikely to create many problems.
There exist already many schemes under the auspices of bodies such
as the I.O.C., as well as the general educational programs established by most developed States. 132 There are some difficulties;
for example, the skills which participants in deep-sea mining ventures acquire will not necessarily be applicable to ventures in shallower coastal waters. These, however, are matters of detail rather
than principle. Contractors engaged in joint ventures with the Authority will find that their contracts include obligations to train
nationals of developing States. 13 3 This is in line with the approach
of all the draft basic conditions except those proposed by the United
States delegation.
The transfer of technology, especially patented technology, will
be more difficult. The complex national laws on confidential information and intellectual property arose precisely because entrepreneurs wanted to be able to prevent competitors from using the technology which they had developed, often at considerable cost, and
on which their ascendancy over their rivals depended. So long as
competition has some place in the International Seabed regime,
whether between competitors for an Authority contract, or between
private enterprises seeking the continuation of the joint venture
system and the Enterprise seeking to move towards complete inde130. See 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 1, U.N. Doe. A/9559 (1974), and especially
resolution 3202 (S-VI), pt. IV therein.
131. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.3 (1974). The document outlines the
work of other bodies on the subject.
132. See Bello, The Present State of Marine Science and Oceanography
in the Less Developed Countries,8 INT'L LAW. 231 (1974).
133. The Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Pt. 1 (1975); Annex, id.,
para. 10 (b). The reference to article 12 in paragraph 8 (b) is to the article
in U.N. Doc A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3 (1974), now article 11 of the Text.
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pendence of these enterprises, this expensive technology is not
likely to be willingly given up.
The text makes some concessions to the interests of the owners
of the technology. Article 39 requires the Authority's inspectors
not to divulge industrial secrets or data declared by the Authority
to be proprietary, or other confidential information coming to them
in their official capacity. Paragraph ten of the Basic Conditions
goes further, allowing the contractor to determine which information is proprietary, with the result that it may not be disclosed to
third parties without the consent of the contractor. It also allows
the contractor to refuse to disclose proprietary equipment design
data. The acceptance of any such compromise, and its implementation, will depend to a considerable degree upon the goodwill of the
business community lobbying national delegations at the Conference, and of the contractors who eventually operate under the
regime. It is a commonplace of contemporary life that many transnational corporations negotiate with governments on equal terms.
It should not be supposed that these corporations will share the
willingness to compromise which governments might demonstrate.13 4 Opposition by transnational corporations could be more
obstructive to the aspirations of the developing States than conservative stances taken by the developed States.
Safety and Pollution
The regime imposes general obligations on the Authority to make
regulations for the protection of the marine environment (article
12) and human life (article 13, article 28). Environmental implications are to be taken into account when framing any regulation
(article 31). However, the question of pollution was not fully considered. This was partly because it was thought less important
than other questions dealt with by Committee I, and partly because pollution in general was dealt with by Committee III. The
Committee IMl text makes no substantial provision on pollution
134. The literature on this topic is voluminous. See, e.g., C.
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arising from" the international seabed (text, pt. III, article 17), except to suggest that the enforcement of standards should be by the
Authority in cooperation with Flag States (pt. HI, article 24). The
deficiencies of Flag State jurisdiction as a basis for the enforcement
of marine pollution regulations are well known. It may be more
effective to base the enforcement of pollution regulations, and all
other regulations promulgated by the Authority, on Port State
jurisdiction.13 5
Compositionof the Authority
The composition of the Authority attracted much discussion.
There is general agreement on the division of powers between an
Assembly of all parties, and a small executive council. Disagreement arises over the question of protecting critical interests of
States within this framework. For example, an American delegate
stated at Geneva that his delegation
attached special importance to a council structure which recognised
the special interests of certain States, both developed and developing ....
[V]oting arrangements should protect the critical interests to that effect while avoiding procedures which might paralyze
decision making.13 6
The position of the Group of 77 was made equally clear at the same
meeting.
The composition of the Council should respect the principle of
equitable geographical distribution, but should also take account of
the interests concerned and possibly affected by activities in the
area. Nevertheless, the Group of 77 could not accept any system
of veto or weighted voting.
An examination of the system of protecting the rights of minority
shareholders in municipal company law might be fruitful in this
context, although it must be remembered that much of the efficacy
of the municipal system is derived from the ease with which disputes may be transferred to the courts, which is unlikely to be the
case under an international regime.
So far as the Assembly is concerned, the "one-State, one-vote"
formula is generally accepted. It should be remembered that the
Group of 77 can hope, at least when it operates as a united group,
to command the two-thirds majority necessary for decisions on
questions of substance. This, of course, is a major factor in the
Group's preference for an Authority with considerable freedom to
establish rules for the regime. So long as the Assembly operates
135. See note 115 supra.
136. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.l/SR.21 (1975).
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as a primarily supervisory body, as is proposed under article 26
of the text, this is likely to be unopposed by the developed States.
The 36-State Council is more controversial. This is a larger body
than most drafts suggested, and therefore has greater flexibility
in the arrangements for representing interest groups. The text
proposes, in article 27, that 24 states should be elected in accordance with the principle of equitable representation of the major
geographical regions-Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe (Socialist),
Latin America, and 'Western Europe and others." Although article 27 does not stipulate the proportion of representatives from each
region, article 35, in providing for representation on the Governing
Board of the Enterprise, requires equal representation for each region. It may be intended that approximate equality should apply
to the composition of the Council. The other twelve seats are
shared equally between States with substantial investment in the
area or possessing advanced technology which is being used in the
area, and developing States, again on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The six developing States' seats are to be
allocated to one State from each of the following categories: landbased exporters of minerals exploitable in the area, States importing these minerals, States with large populations, land-locked
States, geographically-disadvantaged States, and the least developed countries. This will certainly not satisfy the demand of the
13 7
geographically-disadvantaged States for two-fifths of the seats,
and it is unlikely to gain the support of many developed States so
long as the Council retains the wide discretion proposed in the exercise of its considerable powers (article 28). Agreement on the composition of the Council may be made easier if clear limits to its
discretion in matters affecting the "vital interests" of States can be
negotiated and included in the body of the Convention.
Although the Enterprise has a "representative" Governing Board
elected by the Assembly, the other organs of the Authority-the
Technical Commission, the Economic Planning Commission and the
Tribunal-are "expert" bodies to which individuals are elected on
the basis of their expertise, and do not represent their countries'
or any other sectional interests.
137. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.14 (1975).
or shelf-locked States.

There are about 51 land

Dispute Settlement
The question of dispute settlement was the subject of a separate
Working Paper 13 submitted together with the three parts of the
Single Negotiating Text to the Geneva session of the Conference.
Article 57 of the Text contains a preliminary obligation to seek
peaceful settlement of disputes, and follows this with the provision
that any party to the dispute may apply to the Tribunal if the dispute is unresolved within a month. This may be difficult to operate, since disputes often grow slowly out of mere differences of
opinion, and one or other party may deny that a dispute exists.
Although either party to a dispute, whether or not it is a State,
can apply to the Tribunal under -article 57, applications to question
the legality of the measures taken by organs of the Authority can,
according to article 58, only be made by States. Since disputes between, for example, the Authority and a national company may
well involve determinations on the legality of measures, it might
be preferable either to allow companies as well as States to bring
actions under Article 58, or to require all actions to be brought to
the Tribunal by States. Under the latter procedure, where a company's interests were affected, the State responsible under Article
17, or perhaps the "sponsoring" State under paragraph five of the
Conditions, would bring the action in the Tribunal. It may be
easier to secure agreement along these traditional lines. The provision for an Arbitration Commission in article 63 adds little to the
regime, since parties would be entitled to refer the matter to arbitration under article 57.
It is interesting to note that, under paragraph 18 of the Basic
Conditions,
[t]he law applicable to the contract shall be solely the provisions
of this Convention, the rules and regulations presented by the AuNo conthority, and the terms and conditions of the contract ....
tracting State may impose conditions on a Contractor that are inconsistent with the principles of this Convention.

This greatly enhances the legal effect of the general principles at
the beginning of the Convention and to this extent detracts from
the relative certainty of the legal regime under the more detailed
provisions. For this reason, the provision may be unacceptable.
Even if it does secure agreement, parties to a dispute may be discouraged from bringing action before the Tribunal.
138. U.N. Doc. SD.Gp/2d Sess.No.1/Rev.5
762 (1975).
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The most salient feature of the Conference, and the cause of most
of the disagreement, is the imbalance which exists between the
group of States with the greatest economic and political power and
the group of States with the greatest voting power. There is also
a clear unwillingness on the part of each group to trust the other.
There is, of course, no reason why the situation should be otherwise,
since the "national interests" articulated by the representatives of
many developed States are quite opposed to those articulated by
the representations of many developing States.
To speak of national interests is to oversimplify. Within a single
State the defense lobby might be seeking narrow limits of coastal
jurisdiction in order to preserve freedom of passage. The seabed
mining lobby might seek a combination of wide national seabed
jurisdiction and a laissez-faire regime beyond. The environmental
lobby might seek a shift away from laissez-faire policies towards
stricter control over all activities in the seas. The same lobby in
different States may advance different solutions. For example, the
"defense" needs of maritime powers might be said to require maximum freedom of navigation for warships, while the same needs of
developing States might be said to require the right of the coastal
State to deny that very freedom. However, the synthesis of these
domestic pressures into the various national positions leaves a fairly
clear division between States which corresponds closely with the
developed/developing States split.
One reason for this is that since the Conference is renegotiating
the whole international law of the sea, and since at the moment
each major topic is being negotiated more or less separately, each
of the conflicting national interests can be advanced in relation to
specific draft articles. Thus for example, a State can propose the
widest limits for national jurisdiction over the seabed in Committee
T,while seeking the minimum competence for States over coastal
waters in Committee II. The time for trade-offs between topics
has not yet arrived. When it does arrive-if the slow progress of
the Conference does not precipitate a fall into unilateralism-it may
be that, for example, the United States would be prepared to compromise on the international seabed in return for the advancement
of its interests in regard to navigation.

At the moment, the international seabed issue is being argued
for the most part not on the basis of such a compromise, but on
the basis of national interests in that area alone. This inevitably
results in the division along economic lines between States. The
debates have indicated that the developed States (most of whom
advocate, if they do not practice, domestic government through a
one-man, one-vote democracy) are unwilling to risk their national
interests through subjecting activities in the international seabed
area to democratic control. At best, this attitude amounts to the
assertion that, since free enterprise economies cannot compel investment and industrial activity in the area, the international
regime must constitute a legal climate which will attract such investment and activity from those companies possessing the necessary technology by protecting their interests. At worst, it amounts
to the assertion that because the developed States possess this economic power, the perpetuation and protection of this power in the
regime is the price the developing States must pay in order to avoid
unilateral action by developed States from which no other States
would benefit. By opposing United States proposals, for example,
the Group of 77 is risking the very real possibility that internal
political pressure in America will force the Administration to meet
the requests of Deep Sea Ventures 39 for "permission" to begin
immediate activities in the international seabed area.
Apart from the immediate loss of cooperation over the deep seabed, unilateralism would work to the disadvantage of developing
States in general. It is only in international organizations where
they enjoy the benefits of the one-State, one-vote principle, that
they enjoy any considerable power at the moment. It is clear that
developing States cannot match the power of the developed States
outside the Conference chamber, and it is questionable how far the
tactical alliances existing in international organizations would survive the transfer of issues such as the law of the sea into the "real
world." Thus, the Group of 77 has a clear interest in adopting a
moderate line in the Conference-an interest which must have been
brought home recently by American threats of withdrawal from
the I.L.O. and of economic sanctions against States pursuing the
strongly anti-Zionist line in the United Nations.
On the other hand, if the developed States retreat into unilateralism, they risk creating a vacuum in international bodies into which
States capable of marshalling the economic power of the developing
world might be drawn. The extent to which, for example, China
139. See 14 INT'L LEGAL MATEaLus

51, 795, 796 (1975).

[VOL. 13: 489, 1976]

International Seabed
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

(which has not yet played a significant part in the Conference),
would be prepared to act in this role is unclear, but this must remain a consideration in national policies. Equally, there is no doubt
that the developed States wish to be seen to be acting in a fair
manner towards the rest of the world. This will provide a powerful incentive to continue the conduct of negotiations on the law
of the sea in an international conference. Insistence on weighted
votes or vetos, which freeze the power relationships in international
organizations, do not advance this aim. The Group of 77 has made
its opposition to such devices clear, and it might reasonably be expected that this opposition will extend in the future to other bodies,
such as the United Nations Security Council. The political necessity for agreement with the developed States demands some compromise, but this is more likely to be secured through the express
recognition and protection of present needs through substantive
provisions in the Convention than by a permanent grant of "procedural protection."
At the same time that the Group of 77 has been advancing proposals for a strong regime for the deep seabed, they have been proposing an extended zone of coastal State jurisdiction elsewhere in
the conference. Both proposals are aimed at the protection of the
sea and its resources from the possibilities of abuse inherent in a
regime largely based upon the freedom of the high seas. To this
extent the attitude of the group can be said to be negative, although
the results of this stance will undoubtedly make for the more rational management of the oceans. Again, what the attitude does
throw into doubt is the long-term cohesiveness of a group of States
of widely differing national interests.
One of the most interesting aspects of the future of the deep seabed will be the role of the transnational enterprises contracting
with the Authority. There is evident at the moment a growing
concern to ensure that the activities of these corporations are consistent with the national interests of the countries within which
they operate. How far an international Authority, with a membership of widely divergent interests, will succeed in imposing its will
on such companies remains to be seen. Certainly a refusal to yield
up the technological skill which the Authority needs in order to
secure its independence could effectively thwart the planned regime, but it is far from clear how the transfer of this technology

could be compelled. The Convention envisages that there will be
some contractual obligation to this effect, but the efficacy of such
an obligation depends largely upon the cooperation of the contractors concerned, even if the regime as a whole commands sufficient acceptance to enter force.
There has been a great shift in the degree of influence which
the developed and developing States exercise over the creation of
new international law. This has been clear since 1958, but even
since the beginning of the present debates the developing world
has not only been able to determine the pace of debate but also
to determine, as in the text, the ground on which debates take place.
Debates do not necessarily result in progress, but the changes in
national policies on the law of the sea in the last eight years must
be seen as most rapid progress, and in a direction determined
largely by the developing States. The debates of the First Committee of the Conference, dealing as they do with a single problem
in comparative isolation from the other issues in the Conference,
provide a rich store of indications of shifting policies which deserve
close examination, and raise many important problems-not only
for the law of the sea, but for international relations in general.

